Those accustomed to without-notice injunctions will be well-versed in the stringent duty of full and frank disclosure. A recent High Court decision re-emphasises the centrality of that duty, making clear that it applies with equal force to applications heard on short notice. In Lakhany v Hasan [2025] EWHC 3369 (KB), the Court discharged a freezing injunction after finding that the applicant had failed to comply with that duty in multiple, serious respects. The deficiencies included non-disclosure of material information, positively inaccurate submissions, the absence of any solid evidence of a real risk of dissipation, and an order drafted far beyond what the judge appeared to have intended at the initial hearing. Faced with such deficiencies, the Court at the return date had no hesitation in discharging the injunction.
D, resident abroad, was unable to attend the initial hearing. Although notice had been given pursuant to the directions of the Court (it was initially ex parte), it fell short of the requisite three clear days. Accordingly, the application was required to be presented with the same rigour and transparency as a true without-notice application. HHJ Karen Walden-Smith, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, found at the return hearing that this high duty had not been met.
C’s presentation at the first hearing was defective in several material respects. First, it was suggested that C had “discovered” that D had moved to Pakistan to evade the litigation. In fact, D had moved months earlier and had openly notified C’s solicitors. This was not drawn to the judge’s attention.
Second, C asserted that the North London property at the heart of the application was owned and controlled by D. Both assertions were wrong. The property was owned by a company in which D was only a majority shareholder and director, and crucially, it was not under his control, all of which was publicly available information.
Third, it was suggested that D was seeking to sell the property to dissipate assets. In reality, the property had been in LPA receivership since August 2020, and expressly set out in documents attached to an email from D to the Court after receiving notice of the application. D was therefore incapable of dissipating the property, but this was never put before the judge.
Fourth, C failed to alert the Court to the unexplained delay: four weeks between learning of activity at the property and issuing the application, followed by another four weeks before the hearing, despite no effort being made to expedite the matter. The delay was inconsistent with a genuine concern about dissipation.
It is for the applicant to make out their case for a freezing order; the respondent does not have to show that it ought not to be granted, and in the circumstances C could only make assertions of ‘suspicion’ rather than identifying solid evidence, and in any event those suspicions were based on inaccurate information. Unsurprisingly, the Court concluded that there was no evidence of a real risk of dissipation. D’s move abroad was transparent, the property was outside his control, and C’s conduct (significantly, the lack of urgency) suggested a desire not to protect the integrity of a judgment but to obtain an advantageous foothold in the event of success.
Procedurally, the freezing order was also irregular. It was not in the model form, omitted standard undertakings and a return date, and was not served with a hearing note until many months later, which left D unaware of the basis of the injunction. Moreover, the order as drafted went far wider than the judge’s indication at the hearing, focusing not merely on proceeds of sale but purporting to impose worldwide restraints.
The case stands as a reminder that short notice does not dilute the obligations resting on an applicant. The duty of candour is exacting; it requires the fair, thorough, and objective presentation of all material facts. For instance, the mere fact of documents attached to D’s email to the court was not sufficient; C should have accurately presented the case and highlighted all relevant matters. Furthermore, assertions of “suspicion” are no substitute for genuine evidence of dissipation, and applicants who fall short of the required standard can expect their orders to be discharged.